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Abstract. Random number generation is a fundamental security primitive for
RFID devices. However, even this relatively simple requirement is beyond the ca-
pacity of today’s average RFID tag. A recently proposed solution, Fingerprint Ex-
traction and Random Number Generation in SRAM (FERNS) [14,15], involves
the use of onboard RAM as the source of “true” randomness. Unfortunately, prac-
tical considerations prevent this approach from reaching its full potential. First,
this method must compete with other system functionalities for use of memory.
Thus, the amount of uninitialized RAM available for utilization as a randomness
generator may be severely restricted. Second, RAM is subject to data remanence;
there is a time period after losing power during which stored data remains intact
in memory. This means that after a portion of memory has been used for en-
tropy collection once it will require a relatively extended period of time without
power before it can be reused. In a usable RFID based security application, which
requires multiple or long random numbers, this may lead to unacceptably high
delays.
In this paper, we show that data remanence negatively affects RAM based ran-
dom number generation. We demonstrate the practical considerations that must
be taken into account when using RAM as an entropy source. We also discuss the
implementation of a true random number generator on Intel’s WISP RFID tag,
which is the first such implementation to the authors’ best knowledge. By relat-
ing this to the requirements of some popular RFID authentication protocols, we
assess the (im)practicality of utilizing memory based randomness techniques on
resource constrained devices.
Keywords: RFID, True Random Number Generation, Power-up SRAM, Au-
thentication Protocols
1 Introduction
The importance of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology continues to
grow as RFID tags see deployment in an ever expanding variety of applications and
settings. Consequently, RFID security and privacy continues to be carefully scrutinized
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by the research community. Providing security and privacy services in RFID systems
presents unique challenges due to the highly constrained nature of RFID enabled de-
vices. There has been much work on the development of security and privacy mech-
anisms and protocols that attempt to take the limited capabilities of RFID tags into
account. Most, if not all, of these schemes rely on the presence of one of the most
fundamental cryptographic primitives, random number generation.
While modern general purpose computers have many techniques available for the
generation of high quality random numbers, even this relatively simple requirement is
beyond the capacity of today’s average RFID tag. The EPC air interface specification
for the most recent (Class 1 Generation 2) variety of RFID tags includes a provision
for pseudorandom number generation [1]. The resulting random values are intended
to be used only as a collision prevention measure, however. When combined with the
economic considerations of these ultra-low cost devices, the values produced by these
generators are unlikely to be of high enough quality to be used as a source of crypto-
graphic randomness.
A recently proposed alternative, Fingerprint Extraction and Random Number Gen-
eration in SRAM (FERNS) [14,15], involves the use of onboard RAM as the source
of “true” randomness. FERNS works by repurposing blocks of RAM into physical fin-
gerprints which, when run through a random number extractor (e.g., a hash function),
produce random output. This technique is quite promising as any device, regardless of
its constraints, will contain some amount of onboard memory from which randomness
can be drawn. In addition to random number generation, FERNS was also shown to be
capable of creating unique fingerprints with which RFID tags can be uniquely identi-
fied.
Unfortunately, practical considerations prevent the FERNS approach to random
number generation from reaching its full theoretical potential. Since FERNS relies on
preexisting memory circuitry as a source of entropy, it must compete with other system
functionalities for use of this shared resource. Other code running on a RFID tag, such
as the EPC protocol stack itself (that is, the implementation of the protocol in software),
will likely be occupying the device’s memory at any given point during execution. As
such, the amount of uninitialized RAM available for utilization as a randomness gener-
ator may be severely restricted. Furthermore, RAM is subject to a phenomenon known
as data remanence. While it is still volatile in the traditional sense, due to properties of
the underlying hardware such memory retains its contents while receiving power and
for a duration of several seconds afterwards. Thus, there is a time period after losing
power during which stored data remains intact in memory. This means that after a por-
tion of memory has been used for entropy collection once, it will require a relatively
extended period of time without power before it can again be used in this capacity. In
a usable RFID based security application which requires multiple random numbers this
may lead to unacceptably high delays.
Our Contributions: In this paper, we demonstrate the practical considerations that must
be taken into account when using RAM as an entropy source. We discuss the implemen-
tation of a true random number generator on Intel’s WISP RFID tag [21,23], which is
the first such implementation to the authors’ best knowledge [13]. Using this as a basis,
we demonstrate how many bits of randomness one can expect to derive from a RFID de-
vice’s memory at a given time. Our results indicate that at most 309 bits of randomness
can be derived from a tag with 512 bytes of RAM, with this figure dropping sharply as
tag memory capacity decreases.
We then analyze the implications of data remanence on RFID tags and the rate at
which random number generation can be performed. By relating this process to the re-
quirements of some popular RFID authentication protocols, we assess the (im)practicality
of utilizing memory based randomness techniques on resource constrained devices. As
an example, we also discuss the implications that RAM based randomness derivation
would have on the usage model of a typical RFID enabled access card. In addition, we
introduce potential attacks that could be launched on RFID system while this method is
in use.
Paper Organization: The rest of this work is organized in the following fashion. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the fundamentals of RFID systems and discusses related work. In
Section 3, our experiments are explained in detail. Section 4 provides a discussion of
the practicality of the studied approach, based on our experiments. Finally, Section 5
summarizes our results.
2 Background
2.1 RFID Overview
RFID is an increasingly popular technology for computerized identification. An RFID
infrastructure consists of tags and readers. Tags are small transponders that store data
about their corresponding subject, such as an ID value. Readers are used to query and
identify these tags over a wireless channel. In most cases, tags are passive or semi-
passive, meaning they derive the power to transmit data to a reader from the electromag-
netic field generated when a reader sends a query to a tag. Additionally, tags typically
have memory only in the range of 32-128 bytes, perhaps just enough to store a unique
identifier [17]. These ultra-low memory, computational, and power constraints are ne-
cessitated by the fact that RFID tags are designed to be placed ubiquitously in consumer
products, appliances, and even users themselves (in the case of implanted payment to-
kens, for example). The minimalist capabilities of these tags present unique privacy
and security challenges, the issue of random number generation being foremost among
them. How can a device with limited power, memory, computational capabilities, and
user interfaces generate high quality random numbers?
2.2 WISP Tags
In order to investigate this question, we utilized a special type of RFID tag designed by
Intel Research known as a Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) [21,23].
WISPs are passively-powered RFID tags that are compliant with the Electronic Product
Code (EPC) protocol. Specifically, we utilized the 4.1 version of the WISP hardware,
which partially implements Class 1 Generation 2 of the EPC standard. By following
this standard and deriving power only from the transmissions of a commercial RFID
reader, WISPs closely model the type of RFID tag one might expect to find in a typical
contactless access token. Where the WISP differs from standard tags, however, is in its
inclusion of an onboard Texas Instruments MSP430F2132 microcontroller. This 16-bit
MCU features an 8 MHz clock rate, 8 kilobytes of flash memory, and 512 bytes of
RAM. WISPs are the first programmable passive RFID devices. Unlike standard RFID
tags, which are fixed function and state machine based, the flexibility of the WISP
allowed us to implement a random number generator and probe the behavior of memory
on a live, passive RFID device.
2.3 Random Number Generation Based on RAM
A recent proposal to address the difficulty of generating random numbers on a passive
RFID device is called FERNS [14,15]. Instead of treating uninitialized memory as a
indeterminate blank slate, FERNS works by considering this unused memory to be a
fingerprint. This fingerprint can be used in two complimentary ways. The first is as a
means of identifying a given RFID tag through the underlying physical characteristics
of memory. The second is as a potential source of entropy. The focus in this paper is on
the latter application. Each unpowered RAM cell starts in an unstable state, then moves
to a stable state, representing either a ‘0’ or a ‘1’, once supplied with power. Which of
the two bit states the cell enters upon first receiving power is dependant on the threshold
voltage mismatch as well as the thermal and shot noise of the cell. A large threshold
voltage mismatch will cause a RAM cell to reliably initialize to one bit value or the
other. A small mismatch, on the other hand, will be overshadowed by the cell’s noise,
causing it to take on a value randomly at power up. It is the physical noise of these
RAM cells that supply entropy in the FERNS method.
Due to physical impurities, the random, well threshold matched cells will be ran-
domly scattered throughout the RAM. As these bits do not occur in convenient proxim-
ity to one another, an extractor is necessary to pull these desirable bits from the RAM
sequence. A hash function can be used in this capacity. The PH universal hash function
of [24] is recommended due to its suitability for implementation in resource-limited
hardware [14,15]. This function is a variant of the NH hash function that was designed
to be efficient in software in order to accelerate the UMAC message authentication al-
gorithm [5]. PH is the result of a retooling of the NH function in order to remove the
need to perform carry operations, which makes the function more suitable for a hard-
ware implementation in terms of speed, space, and power consumption. PH is defined
in Equation 1. Blocks of uninitialized memory are provided to the hash function as both
key (ki) and message (mi) inputs; the output of the hash function can then be used as a
random bitstream.
PHk(m) =
8∑
i=1
(m2i−1 + k2i−1)(m2i + k2i) (1)
2.4 Data Remanence
Since computer memory is volatile, it is a common belief that data stored in RAM
is completely lost as soon as it ceases to be supplied with power. This is not entirely
accurate, however. While the contents of unpowered RAM will certainly degrade over
time, the decay process takes several seconds to begin and several more to complete
[22,11]. This process is due to the low-level electrical components that comprise a RAM
chip. In SRAM, for instance, data is stored by setting the state of a flip-flop. This state
is maintained as long as the flip-flop continues to receive power [9]. This circuit does
not lose its state immediately upon loss of power, however. The state will remain for a
short interval of time. Thus, there is a brief time period after losing power during which
stored data remains intact. If power is again supplied before the end of this window the
decay process is halted. While the speed of data loss varies greatly between individual
chips, the rate of RAM decay is largely a function of temperature. At high temperatures
the degradation process is accelerated, while if cooled to a low enough temperature the
decay process can effectively be halted indefinitely.
The phenomenon of data remanence has serious repercussions for computer secu-
rity. Many times cryptographic data, such as keys, are stored in RAM. If an adversary
can gain physical access to a RAM chip containing sensitive material, remove it, and
read it on a different device before it fully decays, he or she can potentially recover
a full image of the memory contents, including any stored secrets. Even if the decay
process has already started to set in, statistical techniques can be used to recover lost
bits [11]. While data remanence plays an important part in the work presented in this
paper, it does not involve the recovery of data from memory. Instead, we explore the
implications of data remanence on the frequency of RAM initialization.
2.5 RFID Authentication
One of the most important RFID security challenges is tag authentication. RFID tags
are designed to respond promiscuously to any query from a compatible reader. This
behavior makes the forging and duplication of RFID tags a relatively straightforward
process. Since tags respond to any query, there is little preventing an adversary with
the proper equipment from obtaining a tag’s data, then creating a new tag containing
the exact same value [17]. In many cases, traditional cryptographic solutions can not
be used by RFID tags due to their low computational and memory capabilities. Several
new solutions have been developed to address these problems; one of the best known is
the HB+ protocol [17]. HB+ is a challenge-response scheme based on the HB human
authentication protocol [16] that is designed with the computational and memory con-
straints of RFID tags in mind, requiring only bitwise logic operators for computation.
The only other requisite of HB+ is the tag’s capability to generate high quality random-
ness, a property which today’s RFID tags are ill equipped to meet. The HB+ protocol
requires at least 80 rounds [10], in each of which the RFID tag is expected to generate a
224 bit random value, in order to attain an 80-bit security level. If these rounds are run
in parallel [18], a RFID tag will be required to produce 17,920 random bits at once.
Since its inception, various variants of HB+ have been proposed including HB++
[7], Trusted-HB [6], PUF-HB [12], and HB# [10]. Protocols derived from HB are not
the only RFID security mechanisms that require randomness to operate, though. Other
protocols that are based on pseudorandom functions will also require cryptographic
random numbers to be generated. For example, the tree based privacy-preserving au-
thentication protocols of [20] use pseudorandom functions that require high quality
randomness at each level of the tree.
3 Experiments
In this section, we present the experiments used to measure the amount of randomness
that can be derived from uninitialized RAM, as well as the rate at which this process can
be performed, based on the practical limitations of RFID tags and their usage model.
3.1 Experimental Setup
We utilized the following configuration of equipment for our tests. Four WISP tags of
the latest hardware version, 4.1, were employed. The WISPs are depicted in Figure 1,
with a U.S. quarter placed nearby to provide a sense of scale. When these tags were re-
quired to interact with the RFID reader they were loaded with the 6.0 revision of WISP
firmware. At times when a tag’s memory contents were of interest, tags were loaded
with a C file containing nothing but a blank main function; this was done in order to
minimize the amount of RAM overwritten during program execution. To program these
WISP tags a Texas Instruments MSP-FET430UIF debugging interface [4] was used,
which was interacted with through a desktop computer running the IAR Embedded
Workbench IDE [2]. The debugger was connected to the desktop machine with a USB
cable and to the WISP tag over a JTAG interface. We used an EPC compliant Impinj
UHF Generation 2 Speedway RFID reader [3] running firmware version 3.2.1. Com-
mands were issued to the reader from a desktop machine through a custom application
which communicated with the reader over the Low Level Reader Protocol (LLRP). A
block diagram of this hardware configuration is shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 1. Four WISP 4.1 Tags with a U.S. Quarter Included for Scale
Fig. 2. A Block Diagram of the Experimental Setup
3.2 WISP Implementation
As a first step towards assessing the viability of deriving randomness from RAM on
a passive RFID device, we implemented the random number generation portion of
FERNS on a WISP tag. While RAM based randomness has been implemented on a
desktop computer, to our knowledge this is the first such implementation on a passively-
powered RFID device [13]. The implementation was done in C using the IAR Embed-
ded Workbench IDE. This was a relatively straightforward implementation of the PH
hash function (described in Section 2.3). The main change that had to be made was to
alter the input block size of the PH hash function from 64 bits to 16 bits, which reduced
the size of the hash function’s output from 133 bits to 37 bits. This was done in order
for the hash output to fit into a standard C long long datatype. Had the original 133 bit
output size been used, it would have necessitated the use of a multiple precision arith-
metic library, which would require the dedication of the tag’s scarce computational and
memory resources.
Besides this practical consideration, reducing the block size of the PH function has
theoretical advantages as well. When this function’s block size is set to 64 bits, 64∗32 =
2048 bits of memory, half having been input as message blocks and the other half having
been treated as key blocks, are consumed to produce a single 133 bit hash. When 16 bit
blocks are used instead, only 16∗32 = 512 bits of RAM are needed to produce a 37 bit
hash. While this decreases the amount of random bits output from one call to the hash
function, the smaller block size allows PH to be called 3 more times on distinct blocks of
the same amount of uninitialized RAM, yielding 37∗4 = 148 bits of randomness. Thus,
reducing the block size of the hash function allows more bits to be condensed from
an equivalent portion of memory. This would be problematic if the larger bit amount
exceeded the expected entropy of the values being hashed. Fortunately, this is not the
case. Each bit of tag memory is capable of yielding 0.103 bits of entropy [14,15]. This
means that the 148 bits output by multiple calls to PH with the smaller hash function is
still well within the 210 bits of entropy that 2048 bits of raw memory would be expected
to produce.
As a preliminary test of the random values generated by this “on-tag” random num-
ber generator, 32 blocks of 16 bits each were read from an uninitialized area of the
WISP’s RAM. These values were hashed and written to a different memory address.
We programmed the WISP to perform this operation once per query from the reader.
The resultant 37 bit hash value was copied from memory into the WISP’s EPC ID,
which was then transmitted to the RFID reader in response to its queries. Surprisingly,
we observed that identical values were being transmitted, indicating a clear lack of ran-
domness. Since this random number generation technique is already known to work
on traditional machines [14,15], we set out to investigate the source of the discrepancy
found on the WISP implementation.
3.3 Measuring Data Remanence on WISPs
We altered the WISP tag’s programming to transmit the contents of its memory to the
reader. This was accomplished by programming the tag to break its RAM into blocks.
These blocks were then transmitted through the tag’s EPC ID in the same manner as
was done with the hash values. While there were occasional changes in certain bytes,
the contents of the memory seemed largely unchanged. This was being caused by the
WISP tag’s retention of values between queries. Recall that passive RFID tags derive
power from reader queries. Thus, while continuously being polled for hash or memory
values, the WISP tag was receiving a continuous supply of power, causing it to retain
its RAM state rather than reinitializing its memory after each query.
We arranged a more thorough experiment to analyze the timing of data retention on
the WISP’s memory. The methodology of our experiment was similar to that employed
in [11]. First, the WISP is connected to a desktop machine using the MSP-FET430UIF
debugging interface. We filled all 512 bytes of the WISP memory with a pseudorandom
pattern generated on a desktop machine using the Mersenne Twister [19] implementa-
tion included in the random module of the Python programming language’s standard
library. This pattern was copied to the WISP’s RAM through the Embedded Work-
bench IDE. The WISP tag was then disconnected from the debug interface, depriving it
of power for a certain interval of time. After this, the tag was reattached to the debugger.
Rather than using the reader to supply power to the tag and reading the memory values
through the tag’s EPC ID, which is slow and prone to occasionally missing values, we
resumed supplying the tag with power over the debugger. The contents of the WISP’s
memory were then read back. In order to calculate the tag’s decay rate, we computed
the Hamming distance between the original pseudorandom pattern and the value read
back from the RAM. Two of the 512 bytes of RAM were always overwritten by the
debugger, so these bytes were left out of the analysis. The fact that the original pattern
was pseudorandom meant that it should contain an approximately equal amount of each
bit. Therefore, RAM was considered to be fully decayed once the Hamming distance
between the two strings was at or near 50%. We did not alter the temperature of our
tags; all tests were carried out at room temperature.
We took samples after removing the WISP from power for a duration of 0 to 60
seconds at 5 second intervals. This test was performed on a population of 4 WISP tags.
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Fig. 3. Decay Rate for Each Tag
The results of our tests are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the per-tag decay
rate, while Figure 4 displays the average decay rate across all tags. A logistic curve has
been fit to each data set. While there were some minor variations between samples, the
decay rate observed on each tag was generally well matched to this curve, showing an
initial 15 seconds with little (< 1%) or no decay, then 15 seconds of very rapid decay,
and concluding with the slow decay of whatever data remained. From this data it is clear
that, depending on the particular tag, a powerless period of 25 to 30 seconds is required
to allow the WISP’s 512 bytes of memory to decay completely.
3.4 Available Memory
Having established how long it takes for a WISP’s memory to return to an uninitialized
state, next we turned our attention to how much uninitialized memory is available on
a WISP at any given time. To determine the amount of unused RAM on the latest
version (4.1) of WISP tags used in our experiments, we loaded the tags with their default
firmware and then added the largest data structure the compiler would allow us to store
in the tag’s RAM. We observed that the WISP protocol occupied 136 bytes of this tag
version’s memory, leaving 376 bytes free for use as an entropy source. Note, however,
that by default this firmware does not implement all mandatory aspects of the EPC
standard. Enabling other features of the protocol in the WISP firmware, such as the
ability use multiple readers or read multiple tags simultaneously, takes up an additional
12 bytes of RAM, leaving 364 bytes available for random number generation.
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For earlier versions (2.0 and 2.1) of WISP tags, [8] established that at any given time
112 bytes of WISP memory are occupied by the RFID protocol and stack. Assuming
no additional memory is used in order to program the tag with increased functionality,
this leaves a maximum of 144 uninitialized bytes for random number generation. This
assumes that no other RAM space is occupied by the authentication protocol itself,
which is unlikely to be true in practice.
4 Discussion
4.1 Practicality: Effects of Data Remanence and Available Memory
Taking the HB+ and HB# protocols as motivating examples, we ask: how feasible is the
use of RAM based random number generation for RFID applications in need of random
numbers? To provide 80 bit security, the HB+ protocol requires at least 80 rounds [10],
in each of which the RFID tag is expected to generate a 224 bit random value. If these
rounds are run in parallel, the WISP must be capable of generating 17,920 random bits
at a time. The randomness requirements of the HB# protocol are more modest, requiring
a single round where a 512 bit random value is generated by the tag, though this is at
the cost of a higher memory overhead.
In the FERNS approach, as reported in [14,15], an entropy rate of 0.103 bits of en-
tropy per bit of uninitialized memory was observed. Combining this with the maximum
of 376 bytes of unused RAM on a 4.1 WISP tag yields an expected random number
capacity of 309 bits. A 4.1 WISP tag would therefore require its available memory to
be hashed 58 times in order to meet the randomness requirements of the HB+ protocol
and 2 times in order to generate enough randomness for the HB# protocol. Since a “cool
down” interval of about 30 seconds is required between memory hashes in order to al-
low a WISP tag’s RAM to return to its uninitialized state, this implies that 30 seconds
of wait time would be required for this type of tag to generate enough randomness for a
single HB# session and 28.5 minutes of wait time would be necessary to create enough
random bits for one HB+ protocol instance.
Of course, these estimates only apply to the latest iteration of WISP hardware. RFID
tags with lower capabilities would require even more time. On the earlier 2.0 or 2.1
versions of WISP tags, which featured 256 bytes of RAM in total, out of which 144
bytes are available for hashing, 118 random bits could be expected to be generated
from each memory hash. This would necessitate 152 hashes for HB+ and 5 hashes for
HB#, yielding uninitialization wait times of 76 minutes and 2.5 minutes for each re-
spective protocol. These figures are specific to the specialized WISP hardware, which
for the purposes of allowing programming flexibility have memory capacities well be-
yond those of commercial RFID tags. A typical 5 to 10 cent RFID tag is expected to
have a maximum of only 128 bits of RAM in total [17], making the prospect of deriving
sufficient randomness from this source even dimmer.
4.2 Effect on Usage Model
The issue of RAM data retention is complicated by the RFID usage model. For ex-
ample, consider the case of contactless access card usage. Since cost efficient tags are
passively-powered, they power up when they come into range of a compatible RFID
reader and do not power down until they leave the reader’s field of view. This would
mean that a standard RFID enabled access card would have to be taken outside of the
range of a reader in order to allow its memory to “cool down” and return to an unini-
tialized state in order to perform random number generation. Thus requiring multiple
consecutive RAM hashes would significantly alter the RFID usage model. Instead of
a user presenting his or her tag to a reader once, leaving it present momentarily, and
returning the tag to a pocket or other storage, users would have to repeatedly bring the
access card within the range of the reader and back out again, introducing a high user
burden into the authentication process. Further complicating the situation is the need
for the user to determine when to remove the card from reader’s range and for how
long. We suspect that specialized hardware could be added to a RFID tag to address
this problem by cutting power to memory after a random number generation was re-
quested. This would add complexity and thus cost to the tag, however, contrary to their
intended economic efficiency. Furthermore, a hardware based solution would also not
address the underlying need to wait for several seconds between two consecutive RAM
reads.
4.3 Potential Attacks
The need to move a tag outside of the range of a reader for a fresh random number
generation also introduces the potential for new attacks. If an adversary were able to
continuously supply power to a tag which made use of its RAM for randomness pur-
poses, he or she would essentially force the tag to continuously reuse the same RAM
values for hashing. This would make the values generated extremely predictable, un-
dermining the security of any authentication scheme or cryptographic protocol built on
top of the random number generator. As mentioned above, hardware could be added
to lock down a tag’s memory until it has time to return to a decayed state. However,
this would create the potential for a denial of service (DoS) attack where an attacker
continuously powered a tag, preventing it from generating any random numbers and
thus from being used at all. While DoS attacks on RFID systems are always possible by
simply jamming the radio signals involved, this type of attack is worse in the sense that
it does not involve any jamming in the traditional sense. All an attacker would need to
do is repeatedly issue queries to the tag, rather than continuously jam an entire portion
of the radio spectrum.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, we have presented several practical shortcomings of using general purpose
memory as a source of randomness for low cost RFID devices. Since RAM is already in
short supply on such resource constrained devices, much of it will likely be in use and
thus unavailable as a source of randomness. Due to the phenomenon of data remanence,
a longer than expected wait time is required between consecutive uses of RAM as an
entropy source, making its repeated utilization impractical in the RFID usage model.
We do not conclude, however, that RAM based randomness derivation should be
discarded. This innovative technique remains attractive due to its repurposing of exist-
ing hardware, which is important for minimizing the costs of tag production. On its own,
however, this method seems unlikely to be able to handle the randomness requirements
of current RFID authentication protocols such as HB+, HB#, and related variants.
In practice, many services derive random numbers from environmental noise. As
future work, we plan on investigating the viability of alternative sources of random-
ness, such as onboard sensors, to collect ambient noise of different forms. This ap-
proach would not be subject to the time and space constraints faced when harvesting
entropy from memory. As sensing platforms, WISP tags are well suited to exploring
this area. For example, the current 4.1 iteration of WISP hardware features an onboard
accelerometer, temperature sensor, voltage sensor, and capacitance sensor. Addition-
ally, it is possible to add new sensors by wiring them to a WISP. We intend to analyze
ways in which entropy sources such as these can be aggregated to efficiently produce
the amount of randomness necessary to support various cryptographic protocols aimed
at low cost tags.
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